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Suppression, denial, sublimation: Defending against the initial pains of very long life 
sentences. 
 
Abstract  
The central purpose of the article is to explore the psychic components of the early pains of 
imprisonment described by male and female prisoners serving very long mandatory life 
sentences for murder. While there is a strong tradition of documenting prisoners’ adaptations to 
‘life inside’, little work in prisons sociology explores how life-sentenced prisoners, specifically 
those convicted of murder, reactively respond and adjust to the early years of these sentences. 
Having outlined prisoners’ descriptions of entry shock, temporal vertigo and intrusive 
recollections, we draw upon a Freudian terminology of ‘defence mechanisms of the ego’ to 
argue that suppression, denial, and sublimation represent key ways of ‘defending against’ 
(rather than ‘adapting to’) these experiences. We suggest that the particular offence-time nexus 
of our sample - the specific offence of murder combined with a very long sentence - helps to 
explain these defensive patterns.  
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Since the 1980s, concerns have been raised about managing growing numbers of ‘long-term’ 
offenders in American and British prisons, and a lack of ‘cognizance’ regarding the effects of 
such periods of confinement (e.g. MacKenzie & Goodstein, 1985; Bottoms & Light, 1987). In 
England and Wales, the long-term life-sentenced prison population has experienced large and 
rapid increases over this period, particularly for individuals sentenced in young adulthood;
1
 for 
instance, while ‘life’ once meant serving an average of nine years in prison (cf. Cohen & 
Taylor, 1972), the minimum length of time being served under such sentences has increased 
dramatically in recent years, from 12.5 years in 2003 to 21.1 years in 2013.
2
 Ergo, a growing 
number of prisoners are serving sentences that were almost unheard of a generation ago – 
sentences where the ‘rupture in life trajectories’ induced by incarceration (cf. Mathiassen, 
2016: 4) is more extreme than the majority of sentenced prisoners – and in conditions about 
which very little is known. 
This article reports findings from a wider study examining the experiences of men and 
women serving very long mandatory life-sentences (minimum tariffs of 15 years or more) for 
murder received when aged 25 or under. Its particular focus is on their reaction to the early 
years of their sentence, a period during which problems of imprisonment were reported as 
particularly ‘severe’ (see Hulley, Crewe & Wright, 2015). Of key interest is, firstly, the specific 
pains of imprisonment that characterised the early phase of confinement for those within our 
sample, namely: entry shock, temporal vertigo, and intrusive recollections. Having outlined 
these experiences, we explore our second point of interest – that is, the ways in which 
participants coped with, responded to, and ‘defended against’ these initial pains. In doing so, 
and having found existing frameworks incapable of accounting for our participants’ 
preoccupations, we have turned to Freudian terminology of suppression, denial, and 
sublimation to account for the processes of psychic defending that our participants described. 
Our overall argument is that these patterns of experience and adjustment reflect a specific 
Offence-Time Nexus; that is, we suggest that these defensive patterns represent a specific 
response to: i) the offence of murder; and ii) the temporal conditions of exceptionally long 
‘life’ sentences. 
                                                 
1
 Information obtained from Ministry of Justice by Dr Susie Hulley, Institute of Criminology, University of 
Cambridge - Freedom of Information request FOI/68152, December 2010. 
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 Information obtained from Ministry of Justice by Jonathan Bild, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge - 
Freedom of Information request FOI/89346, April 2014. 
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The pains of long-term and life imprisonment 
I remember all too well the struggle to find a reason to get out of my prison bed in the 
morning. In the beginning, for 23 hours a day, all I had was a bed, a table, a chair and 
[…] a toilet. The future was just a long, dark tunnel. 
(James, 2013, para. 3) 
 
Within the long and venerable tradition relating to the ‘pains of imprisonment’ there is a 
smaller body of research examining the specific difficulties experienced by the long-term 
prisoner
3
 - a field which flourished in the second half of the 20
th
 century, and debated the 
degree to which individuals incarcerated for extended periods of time experienced mental, 
emotional, and intellectual ‘deterioration’ (e.g. Cohen & Taylor, 1972; Sapsford, 1978; 
Banister, Smith, Heskin, & Bolton, 1973; Richards, 1978; Flanagan, 1981).  
Liebling and Maruna (2005:3) argue that, in recent years, prisons sociologists have ‘not 
taken seriously enough’ the damaging effects of imprisonment. For those experiencing long-
term exposure to the ‘internal chaos, disorganization, stress, and fear’ inherent in imprisonment 
(Haney, 2001, para. 31), the consequences are ‘analogous to the acute reactions of trauma 
victims’, including: insomnia, anxiety, panic, withdrawal, loss of control, aggression, rage, 
hopelessness, lethargy, depression, emotional breakdowns, and self-mutilation (Haney & 
Lynch, 1997:529). This uniquely harmful ‘assault on the self’ inflicted on the long-term 
prisoner (Flanagan, 1981:211) must be endured alongside the ‘petty humiliations and daily 
injustices’ which form the backbone of any prison term (cf. Liebling & Maruna, 2005:3). This 
experience may be all the more ‘cruel and deprived’ for women (MacKenzie, Robinson, & 
Campbell, 1989:224), or those faced with the ‘loss’, ‘liminality’, and ‘social death’ of the life 
sentence (cf. Jewkes, 2005).  
Further, these psychological harms of imprisonment extend beyond the prison gates. 
Lengthy terms in prison ‘create habits of thinking and acting that can be dysfunctional’ - 
‘hypervigilance, interpersonal distrust, and suspicion’, for example - which represent a 
‘significant impediment’ to post-prison adjustment (Haney, 2001, para.38). Such harms may be 
                                                 
3 Long-term imprisonment lacks a singular definition, varying across time and place. In England and Wales, the 
Ministry of Justice (2013) recently defined ‘long-term’ as ‘four years or more, including life sentences’, and most 
definitions of ‘long-term’ prisoner fall somewhere between four and 10 years (e.g. MacKenzie & Goodstein, 
1985; Zamble & Porporino, 1988; MacKenzie, Robinson & Campbell, 1989). Such definitions are unlikely to 
capture the experience of the 21st-century long-term ‘lifer’, who can now expect to serve an average minimum of 
21 years. For purposes of the current study – and therefore, for this paper - a ‘long-term’ indeterminate prison 
sentence is defined as a minimum tariff of 15 years or more. 
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irreversible. For women in particular, the pains of long-term incarceration may be exacerbated 
by the constraints it places on motherhood, ‘forcibly suspend[ing] or even terminat[ing]’  the 
possibility of becoming mothers at all (Jewkes, 2005:369; Jose-Kampfner, 1990; Walker & 
Worrall, 2000).  
Of particular and long-standing concern in much of this literature is the ‘astounding’ 
absence of knowledge (Wormith, 1984:427) related to the ‘lasting effects’ on the human 
personality of long-term imprisonment (Home Office, 1968), as well as the ‘significant 
unresolved questions’ which abound in relation to the post-release re-entry of such individuals 
to the outisde world (Jose-Kampfner, 1990:122). Our particular concern in this article, 
however, is the early phase of the very long sentence. Recent studies have challenged a priori 
suppositions of early prisons sociologists in relation to the ‘curvilinear’ impact of incarceration 
(i.e. the assumption of problems ‘increasing with length of time in custody’) (Liebling & 
Maruna, 2005:12), re-focusing academic interest on the initial stages of imprisonment and the 
intense ‘psychological discomfort’ generated during this time (Zamble, 1992:420). Mackenzie 
and Goodstein (1985:395, 409) attribute the particularly ‘traumatiz[ing]’ nature of the early 
stages of long sentences to the absence of ‘light at the end of the tunnel’, while James (2013) 
idenitifes this period as presenting a basic existential challenge to the will to survive. Such 
sentiments are also borne out in data identifying prisoners serving very long/life sentences as 
presenting a particularly high risk of suicide (Liebling, 1999:302). 
 
Responding to the pains of early-stage imprisonment  
While the prison environment ‘presents extraordinary adaptive problems’ (Irwin, 
1987/1970:67), a wealth of studies within the field of prison sociology testify to the capacity of 
prisoners to adjust to a world that is typically unfamiliar, intimidating and painful (Crewe, 
2009:149). Early research into prison adjustment tended to identify the ‘social roles’ adopted to 
‘reduce the rigours of prison life’ (Sykes, 1958/2007:107), or highlighted the forms of criminal 
identity which mapped onto particular prisoner orientations (Irwin, 1987/1970). Crewe (2009) 
identifies an important semantic consideration here – that is, adaptive styles can be identified as 
nouns (types of prisoner), or as verbs (forms of behaviour). While both Sykes and Irwin fall 
within the former – as does Crewe’s own typology – other studies emphasise the latter, for 
example Zamble and Porporino’s (1988) model of low-level, high-level, and reactive problem-
oriented coping, and Toch and Adams’ (1989) five-fold classification of maladaptation to 
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imprisonment (gratifying impulses; seeking refuge; enhancing esteem; pursuing autonomy; and 
maintain sanity). This distinction is important because it provides an anchor for locating the 
current article within the relevant literature - as an example of the latter - and for identifying 
our own analysis as one that is focused not on individual pathologies but on the processes and 
‘group behavioral patterns’ (Toch & Adams, 1989:128) of those psychically defending against 
very long term imprisonment for murder from a young age.  
For our purposes, existing ‘adaptive’ frameworks are unsuitable due to three key 
features of our population: first, the specific ‘pains’ that relate to their particular offence 
(murder); second, the extraordinarily long indeterminate sentences they are facing; and third, 
the inclusion within our sample of female prisoners, whose experiences are rarely represented 
in adaptive classifications (cf. Hartnagel & Gillan, 1980; though see Heffernan, 1972 for an 
exception). Moreover, we argue that the language of ‘defending against’ these pains more 
accurately represents their experiences in the initial years of such lengthy sentences, reflecting 
the essentially ‘reactive’ rather than ‘proactive’ nature of these responses.  
In attempting to revise and extend the literature on patterns of ‘adaptation’ among such 
prisoners - and in recognition of the particular psychological demands of adjusting to a murder 
conviction and of receiving a sentence of extraordinary length - we draw on the Freudian 
concept of ‘defence mechanisms of the ego’. Developed by Sigmund Freud in the early 20th 
century, the notion of discrete ‘mechanisms of defence’ originally related to the quest to 
understand unconscious processes by which ‘the ego’ – that is, the self – protects ‘against 
painful or unendurable ideas or affects [i.e. emotions]’ (Freud, 1937/1992:42). While such 
ideas - and in particular their unconscious nature - suffered extensive criticism, more recent 
psychoanalytical, psychological, and even sociological, research demonstrates a ‘renewed 
interest’ in the concept (Cramer, 2000:637). One key area of study is the protective potential of 
such ‘defence mechanisms’ for individuals undergoing particularly painful or traumatic 
experiences. Given the longstanding interest within prison sociology in the way that prisoners 
seek to ‘defend against’ the various assaults on the ‘self’ posed by incarceration, the use of 
such concepts to help interpret their responses – particularly when described in primarily 
reactive terms - seems long overdue. 
The current study 
The study on which this article is based focused on men and women serving very long 
indeterminate sentences (i.e. with a minimum/‘tariff’ period of 15 years or more) received 
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when aged 25 years and under. All had been convicted of murder within the criminal justice 
system of England and Wales, and were serving mandatory life sentences.  
 
The focus on this specific group was born out of a concern with the increasing number of 
prisoners serving very long sentences, and the absence of research on the experiences and 
consequences of such disposals, both for offenders themselves and for those who manage them. 
Data provided by the National Offender Management Service at the start of the fieldwork 
period, in February 2013, reported that there were 808 prisoners in prisons in England and 
Wales who matched the research criteria, held across 73 prison establishments. In total, 309 
men (39% of the male population who matched the research criteria) and 23 women (79% of 
the female population who matched the research criteria) participated in the study, either by 
conducting an in-depth interview, completing a survey,
4
 or both.
5
  
Research Setting, Sample, and Method 
146 interviews (n=21 women and n=125 men) were conducted in 25 different prisons (sixteen 
men’s prisons and nine women’s prisons) within the England and Wales prison system. 
Establishments visited covered all five security categories (High Security, Category B, 
Category C, and Open prisons), and included both adult and Young Offender Institutions. It is 
of particular relevance to this paper that all of the women and men interviewed had been 
convicted of murder and had received a mandatory life sentence.  
Male interviewees were selected based on a purposive sampling procedure designed to 
capture prisoners at different stages of these very long sentences, defined as follows: Early - 
less than 4 years served; Mid – the mid-point of the tariff, plus or minus 2 years; Late – tariff 
end date minus 2 years onwards. This aspect of the research design was based on an 
assumption that modes of adaptation change over time (cf. Clemmer, 1940/1958) and therefore 
our ambition was to explore the ways in which different stages of the sentence present different 
challenges for the long-term prisoner (while acknowledging the potential for cohort and period 
effects within this; see Crewe, Hulley & Wright, under review). 
                                                 
4
 For further information relating to the design, implementation, and results of the survey see the paper by Hulley, 
Crewe & Wright (2015), which reports exclusively on this.   
5
 The breakdown of individuals involved in completing a survey, an interview, or both, is as follows: n=294 men 
and n=21 women men conducted surveys; n=126 men and n=21 women took part in interviews. Of these, 112 
men and 3 women only completed a survey (and did not participate in an interview), while 183 men and 5 women 
only took part in an interview (and did not complete a survey).    
7 
 
Due to the relatively low numbers of women serving very long life sentences from 
young adulthood at the time of our fieldwork (29 overall within the nationwide population, not 
all of whom took part in our study) we sought to interview all those who met our research 
criteria, regardless of sentence stage (in fact, only two of our interviewees did not fall within 
one of our pre-designated sentence stages - these are represented in the Other category in the 
table below). 
Details of the overall interview sample, which represented nearly one fifth of the total 
population in which we were interested, are shown below in Table 1: 
 
INSERT TABLE 1, centred 
 
Interviews were conducted in two parts. The first was a detailed life history interview, 
which drew on the literature on narrative inquiry and life stories (e.g. Hollway & Jefferson, 
2000; McAdams, 1988) and focused on pre-sentence life (e.g. familial relationships, life 
aspirations, and experiences of education, authority, criminal justice and state regulation). The 
second part of each interview focussed on life inside prison, exploring: particular problems 
faced by prisoners serving such sentences; how they sought to psychologically manage the 
sentence; thoughts on identity, change and future; social adaptations (specifically, relationships 
with other prisoners and staff); and thoughts on the legitimacy of their predicament (both the 
conviction and the sentence). Our questions included: ‘Thinking back now, can you tell me 
how you felt when you were first given this sentence?’, ‘How has being a long-term prisoner 
changed you as a person?’, ‘What have you found to be the three most difficult things about 
serving your sentence?’, and ‘How hopeful are you generally about your future?’ 
All interviews were transcribed and coded in full. The data was subjected to an iterative 
analytic approach, by which we mean ‘visiting and revisiting the data’, and moving between 
forms of inductive and deductive reasoning, in order to refine understanding (Srivastava & 
Hopwood, 2009: 77). In practice, this meant noting down key themes and ideas as we read the 
interview transcripts, based both on relevant literature and emerging issues, discussing our 
thinking collectively, returning to the data to check whether our ideas held weight, and refining 
these ideas until we were satisfied that they provided an account that was both faithful to the 
data and informed by relevant theory and concepts. 
The initial pains of long-term confinement from young adulthood  
While some experiences recounted by interviewees could be interpreted within existing 
frameworks of the ‘pains of imprisonment’, the emotional and psychological content of the 
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interviews went far beyond those standard ‘pains’ that typically feature within the research 
literature. This was particularly so when describing the early stages of the sentence, 
specifically, forms of entry shock, temporal vertigo, and intrusive recollections. In outlining 
these experiences, we seek to emphasise the way in which they were informed by what we are 
calling the offence-time nexus: that is, the interplay between the extreme nature of both the 
sentence length, and of the irremediable nature of the offence of murder for which interviewees 
had been convicted. While notable – and important - differences existed between our male and 
female participants (as we discuss further in Crewe, Hulley & Wright, in progress), the 
strategies described below were broadly relevant across boundaries of gender, ethnicity, and 
other such variables. That is, the ways in which participants ‘survived’ their predicament were 
remarkably similar. 
‘Entry shock’  
Narratives of numbness and shock, and themes of darkness, illusion and hopelessness, 
dominated interviewees’ accounts of the initial period of imprisonment following conviction 
and sentencing. Many described the experience as ‘unreal’, as they struggled to process the 
events they were experiencing: 
 
I spent the first month in complete shock and I thought I would wake up and go home. 
It wasn't real […] And it hurt - it felt like somebody was ripping my chest open. I saw 
no future, no point to tomorrow. It was the darkest time of my life […] Because there 
was no going back - there was no changing this; there was no undoing it or fixing it, or 
making it better. And suddenly everything is ripped away from you, and feels like it's 
been taken to a different planet.  
Maria, early twenties, 20+ years’ tariff, Early6 
 
Others described a state of emotional and experiential numbness, akin to the ‘dissociation’ – a 
‘disengagement between self and environment’ - evident in the criteria for post-traumatic stress 
disorder (cf. Feeny et al, 2000:491).  
 
                                                 
6
 All names referred to are pseudonyms. Quotes are accompanied by an interviewee identifier, which includes 
interviewee pseudonym, age, tariff length and sentence stage (as explained above). Interviewee anonymity is 
paramount. Therefore where detailed descriptions of events, personal circumstances, or sentences risk rendering 
interviewees identifiable - especially among the smaller population of women where this is more likely – 
identifiers may be shortened, modified so as to increase opacity, or certain items omitted. 
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In the early days following the verdict, it felt like an out-of-body experience almost. I 
was… I didn’t feel like the steps I was taking were my own. I felt completely numbed. 
Dan, late twenties, 15-year tariff, Early  
 
Thinking back like to the first days and weeks once you’d been sentenced - can you 
remember how you felt at that time? 
[It] felt like I was walking around in the clouds? It’s hard to describe, but I think from 
the shock? Yeah, I felt a bit numb […] l was walking around in like a dream state. A 
sad dream state. 
Karen, late twenties, 20-year tariff, Mid 
 
Such sentiments of numbness and dissociation were expressed with comparatively more 
intensity, and appeared to last longer, among the women we interviewed, supporting Jose-
Kampfner’s (1990) findings that, when sentenced, female prisoners experience an extended 
period of ‘grief’. Entry shock was also more intense for those who had admitted guilt. Similar 
to the homicide perpetrators in Adshead, Ferrito and Bose’s (2015:72-3) study, these men and 
women were weighed down by the ‘horror’ and ‘irrevocability’ of their own extreme actions. 
This was particularly acute for those who had killed someone they knew well or loved: 
 
When I first came in my head was all over the place, like. I’d just killed my mate. 
Blake, early twenties, 21-year tariff, Early  
 
I just completely lost myself again [after being sentenced], and I was just like really in 
on myself. I was just grieving for my boyfriend. I was missing him and it was horrible 
[…] My head was properly twatted. 
Liz, early twenties, 15-year tariff, Early  
 
In such cases, it was almost impossible to disentangle the degree to which entry shock 
emanated from the conviction and sentence as from the act of killing itself. 
 ‘Temporal vertigo’ and time-based anxieties 
I began my long-term confinement in my early 20’s, but would not breathe the fresh air 
of freedom until I was well into my 60’s. At 20 years of age, it is difficult to imagine 
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being 30. It is much more difficult for a 20 year-old prisoner to realize that release from 
prison will not come until several decades pass […] Such a long sentence did not seem 
real. How could it? The sentence was nearly twice as long as I had been alive on the 
planet. 
(Santos, 1995:37-38) (emphasis added) 
 
Time is the essence of sentencing and imprisonment, and – as suggested above – the sheer 
burden of the time that lay ahead in prison weighed extremely heavily on the minds of 
interviewees. Those who were in, or were recalling, the early phases of their sentence often 
noted the difficulty of coming to terms with the fact that they would be imprisoned for more 
years than they had been alive, or at least, had been conscious of their own existence. Such 
descriptions often conveyed a sense of temporal vertigo - an overwhelming feeling of 
dizziness, resulting from the sense that time was warping and falling away. One interviewee 
talked of ‘his future flashing before his eyes’, highlighting this sense that ontological ground 
was disintegrating around him. To quote another:  
 
I was 19, when I got sentenced. Basically, all them years I’ve just done, growing up, 
I’ve got to do them again in prison, and it’s like, ‘Whoa!’ I just didn’t want to think 
about it cos I knew if I thought about it a lot then it would just mess up my head. 
Curtis, late twenties, 19-year tariff, Mid  
 
The importance of the combination of age when sentenced and sentence length on the 
‘temporal parameters of pain’ is emphasised by O’Donnell’s (2014:202) concept of the Pain 
Quotient, which takes account of the time left to be served and time left to be lived. As the 
former eclipses the latter, O’Donnell suggests, the challenge of ‘making sense of prison time’ 
intensifies. Indeed, interviewees in our study consistently talked about their struggle to ‘get 
their head around’ the length of their sentence. To do so required a temporal coping framework 
that (initially at least) most simply did not have; that is, they had no cognitive blueprint for 
‘making sense’ of the length of the sentence they had been given, and its consequences, 
because such an event was beyond the reach of their experience and imagination:  
 
I had no concept of 18 years of life. You know what I mean? [Five years in] I think 
really I’ve only just got my head around it. 
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Hugo, early twenties, 18-year tariff, Early  
 
You cannot comprehend it […] You say the first few days and weeks?! It's nothing to 
do with the first few days - it's the first few years. It takes two, three, four, five years 
before you start to get your head around the sentence you're doing, that type of 
sentence. 
Neil, early thirties 18-year tariff, Mid  
 
Interviewees in this early stage were generally unable to articulate their thoughts in relation to 
the remote future (see O’Donnell 2014:203). Few could contemplate what their life might look 
like in half a decade, let alone the world they would inhabit on release: 
 
And can you imagine your life five years from now? […] Can you imagine your 
release? 
No. No. What of this sentence?! […] I can’t imagine it - I don’t know where I am going 
to be. I don’t know what is going to happen […] My parole is in 2036 - the world is 
going to be crazy then - I don’t even want to think about that. 
Damien, early twenties, 27-year tariff, Early  
 
Concerns about time were not just centred on the ‘self’, but extended to relational issues, 
particularly thoughts about loved ones left behind in the aftermath of their conviction. Most 
commonly, when reflecting on the time that would have to serve, interviewees expressed 
profound concerns regarding the wellbeing of family members and fears that loved ones might 
die during their sentence: 
 
I just kept thinking “20 years?!” And I kept thinking too much ahead on the same day I 
got sentenced – “How am I - how long I'm going to be [here]? How is it going to be like 
when I get out? And how is my family going to survive?” It was too, too much 
questions and no answers. 
Aakif, early twenties, 19-year tariff, Early 
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My mum might die today, my grandma tomorrow, anyone could go.  Who knows!  
That’s what I am saying. That’s certain stuff that I can’t take as well, losing people on 
the outside, I can’t take it. 
Damien, early twenties, 27-year tariff, Early 
 
For those interviewees with children, a particularly painful aspect of temporal vertigo was the 
consideration of one’s sentence in relation to the age of one’s own children. For example, Liz 
(early twenties, 15-year tariff, Early) talked at length about how ‘hard’ it was thinking about 
‘time left to serve’ in relation to the lost years of her son’s life, who was eight years old at the 
time of interview, and would be in his twenties when Liz reached her tariff date. 
 
The offence-time nexus relating to serving such long sentences from young adulthood – when 
the children of interviewees were generally very young – was also identified as resulting in the 
loss of the core joys and privileges of being a parent; this was identified as an acutely painful 
experience by both mothers and fathers: 
 
Because my little girl was less than a year old when I came to prison, I missed her first 
steps, I missed her first words, and I missed like all of the firsts, and it’s, like, that’s 
quite difficult.  
Catherine, early twenties, 22-year tariff, Early  
 
Early-stage interviewees who did not have children prior to incarceration expressed deep 
concerns about the ability to be a ‘full’ parent upon release, hinting at anxieties about their own 
mortality: 
 
[Having children] feels possible, but it feels - like, I'm going to be old, like in my late 
thirties? And I'm having a kid? So, when the kid's 10, I'm going to be nearly 50?! So 
basically, I can't run in the park with him - I'll be all old. 
James, early twenties, 22-tear tariff, Early 
  
If I get out, I'll be 47 - I'm not going to want a child at that age, do you know what I 
mean? My baby will probably be - my baby would be 10 and I'll be like 57 and dying or 
something […] What's so fun about that?  
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Tamara, early twenties, 20+ years’ tariff, Early  
 
As also identified by Walker and Worrall (2000:28), concerns with the loss of ‘control over 
fertility’ and the possibilities of future parenthood were particularly painful for women. Those 
women who talked about their intention to have children upon release noted the young age at 
which they had started their current sentence. This temporal aspect of the experience enabled 
them to offset concerns such as those expressed by James and Tamara above: 
 
I will have an opportunity to have children and start over again because I’ve got this 
[sentence] out of the way earlier. 
Liz, early twenties, 15-year tariff, Early 
 
Others, though, saw the long-term and indeterminate nature of their sentence as representing 
the death knell of their fertility: 
 
I’ve resigned myself that that’s never gonna happen […] And that’s my one regret – not 
having children. 
Tori, early thirties, 15-year tariff, Late 
 
‘Intrusive recollections’  
Intrusive recollections – repeated and vivid flash-backs, nightmares, and unwanted thoughts 
regarding a specific event – have long been recognised as symptomatic of the experience of 
trauma, representing one of the key diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) (Cramer, 2000). Such recollections are termed ‘intrusive’ because they are involuntary 
and ‘unwanted’ to those who experience them; in this respect, they are distinct from voluntary 
ruminations on an event (Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens & Clark, 2000). The experience of 
intrusive recollections, and of PTSD more broadly, has been repeatedly identified in relation to 
the trauma of crime victimisation (e.g. Barker-Collo, Melnyk & McDonald-Miszczak, 2000). 
Less common, however, are studies linking offence-induced trauma to the perpetrator, who 
may also experience shock, disbelief, and invasive recollections following their own act of 
killing or of witnessing a murder: 
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[V]ivid images of and detailed flashbacks to the crime scene, distressing dreams of the 
event, [and] avoidance of stimuli remind the perpetrator of the killing […] The 
perpetrator’s reaction may, therefore, resemble the typical pattern of psychological 
responses to an isolated, overwhelming and traumatic experience. 
(Pollock, 2000:177) 
 
Many interviewees reported a similar narrative – to borrow Meichenbaum’s (1996, cit. in 
Pollock, 2000:177) phrase regarding the impact of traumatic events - of the killing being 
‘indelibly etched on the individual’s mind’,,  and of being repeatedly re-experienced through 
flashbacks and nightmares:
7
 
 
For months afterwards […] I tried to distance myself from it but my body wouldn’t let 
me forget because of the bloody nightmares. Like night terrors?  
Karen, late twenties, 20-year tariff, Mid 
 
I get visions of her face sometimes in my dreams […] It’s horrible.  
Laura, late twenties, 18-year tariff, Early  
 
I’m suffering flashbacks […] from the event what happened. I pray to god every day 
that it goes away - I don’t want it to be with me for the rest of my life.   
Zufar, early twenties, 25-year tariff, Early 
 
Despite the prevalence of such narratives, interviewees repeatedly stated that little support was 
available for them to deal with such recollections, particularly during the early years of their 
sentence, when they were most frequent and intense. Some late-phase interviewees reported 
having received no psychological or psychiatric support for their experiences at all: one female 
interviewee, for example, had served more than 20 years, and yet had “never had counselling 
for the fact that [she had] watched two brutal murders”. Although the idea that homicide 
perpetrators might be traumatised by their own actions might seem perverse or ‘surprising’ (cf. 
Pollock, 2000), it was evident that the commission or witnessing of a murder could result in a 
deeply ‘traumatic psychological response’, of the type identified by Pollock (2000:177). How 
our interviewees reacted to – and ultimately, defended against - such experiences, and to the 
                                                 
7
 Flashbacks and recollections were often triggered by temporal cues, such as an anniversary of the offence, or by 
physical cues, such as specific smells, sights or sounds. 
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feelings of entry shock and temporal vertigo that we have thus far highlighted, is the subject of 
the remainder of this article. 
Modes of adjustment 
According to O’Donnell (2014:222), the primary concern of the prisoner in solitary 
confinement is ‘taming time’, and ‘reframing’ the isolation inherent in their predicament. For 
individuals in our sample, often serving minimum sentences longer than they had been alive, 
mastering some sense of both the present and the future – ‘doing the sentence’, rather than 
letting the sentence ‘do them’ – was a central concern. Many prisoners talked of the basic 
necessity of ‘survival’, and of the fact that they had no option but to ‘cope’ with what seemed 
like an un-survivable situation. More than this, however, our interviewees also had to contend 
with reconciling themselves with the offence for which they had been convicted (i.e. murder), 
whether or not they considered themselves to be guilty. This dual psychological burden, 
involving a particular combination of time to be served alongside the burden of an extreme 
offence, generated three primary patterns of response:  suppression, denial, and sublimation.  
‘Suppression’  
Suppression represents an important and high adaptive psychic defence mechanism (Cramer, 
2000). Like its less ‘mature’8 cousin ‘repression’9, suppression also enables the minimisation 
of painful affects and realities. Unlike the former - whereby all conscious awareness of conflict 
and painful realities is banished; ‘disguised’ and ‘ignored’ - suppression involves ‘far more 
than a simple neglect or repression of reality’ (Valliant, 1994:45). Instead, it represents a form 
of mental cognisance which enabled the pains of early imprisonment to be acknowledged at 
certain times, and suppressed at others. This ability was identified within interviewees’ 
narratives as crucial to surviving the early years of the sentence:  
 
I just try and block a lot of things out, me […] If it's too stressful to think about, I just 
don't think about it.  
Liz, early twenties, 15-year tariff, Early  
                                                 
8
 Within the current context, the terms maturity and immaturity refer specifically to their use within clinical 
psychiatry as developmental indicators of the ‘adequacy’ of an individual’s ‘interpersonal and global functioning’ 
(Cramer, 2000:642). ‘Defence mechanisms’ are hierarchically arranged, with the most ‘mature’ [i.e. high 
adaptive] at the top, and the least ‘mature’ [i.e. low adaptive] at the bottom (Cramer, 2000).  
9
 ‘Repression’ does not represent a defence mechanism per se, as if simply – and successfully - ‘blotting’ out of 
the conscious mind the painful reality in question were so easily and effectively achieved, ‘then there would be no 
need for defence mechanisms’ (Baumeister, Dale & Sommer, 1998:1084-5). 
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The less aware you are, the easier it is to deal with, innit? […][B]lank nothingness - 
that's what gets you through. And if you can put yourself in that kind of state, that's how 
you survive. 
Neil, early thirties, 18-year tariff, Mid  
 
Such techniques of avoidance were often acknowledged as a deliberate and pro-active means of 
trying to escape from, for instance, intrusive recollections of the index offence. For those who 
could not rely on the power of the mind alone to block out ‘unwanted thoughts’, suppression 
was also achieved through the use of narcotics (both prescription and illicit) and alcohol. 
Identified as a popular means of ‘seeking refuge’ from the impact of time (Toch & Adams, 
1989; see also Cope, 2003), the pursuit of chemical oblivion served to bypass or accelerate the 
early period of confinement by consciously and ‘forcibly ejecting unwanted thoughts from the 
conscious mind’ (Baumeister et al, 1998:1085): 
 
The whole point of taking heroin became that I didn’t [have to] think about a minute [of 
the sentence], really.  
Phillip, late thirties, 16-year tariff, Mid  
 
I’d say the first five years are the hardest, because you’re coming to terms with your 
sentence […] Going home was just - it was too far away. But I got through it. I survived 
it. I dragged myself through with whatever means was available really.  
Yvette, early thirties, 15-year tariff, Mid  
 
For some interviewees, however, the need to escape principally reflected the “sheer boredom” 
of being a long-term prisoner. Again, substance use provided a means for achieving this, 
facilitating escape through sleep, which represented another means of cheating temporality: 
 
When I first come in, I was on Category A, so, you’re […] locked up in your cell for 23 
hours a day […] In the early stages you don’t even know what you do. Just sleep. Do a 
hell of a lot of sleeping […] I was just messing about, taking drugs and things, drinking 
and that [because of the] sheer boredom. That’s all it’s about, nothing else - escapism, 
getting out that cell […] Just makes you feel good for a bit. 
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Bryant, early forties, 17-year tariff, served 20+ years 
 
While such patterns of adjustment have more been presented as maladaptive within prison 
sociology (although see Toch & Adams, 1989), suppression has long been considered as 
evidence of ‘high adaptive’ and ‘mature’ coping within the field of psychiatry (Cramer, 2000). 
While we do not seek to judge the veracity of either discipline’s claim, suppression was clearly 
represented by our participants as a useful defensive means for doing so.  
‘Denial’ 
One of Freud’s original ‘defence mechanisms of the ego’, ‘painful’ claims from the external 
world can be managed through denial; that is, ‘ward[ed] off’ by ignoring or disavowing their 
very existence (Modell, 1961:533). This, Cramer (2000) suggests, is a less ‘mature’ defence 
than the conscious postponement of pain through suppression or the ‘creative’ pro-activity of 
sublimation. Denial is distinct from these ‘high adaptive’ defences because of its unexpurgated 
refusal to acknowledge the existence of the problematic reality at hand. In the current context, 
suppression does not deny the external reality of the sentence or offence, but postpones the 
point at which they are considered; conversely, denial involves unequivocally disputing (rather 
than accepting) problematic elements of the external reality (e.g. commission of the offence, or 
the legitimacy of the sentence). 
While sometimes referring to outright abjuration of the commission of a specific 
offence, denial is more appropriately acknowledged as existing on a ‘continuum’ of behaviours 
(Levenson & Macgowan, 2004:52; Cohen, 2001:xi). Here, we focus on two specific states of 
denial, centred on the offence-time nexus: i.e. the first relates to the offence itself, and the 
second to time and the sentence. Both positions - which sometimes occurred alongside each 
other, and at other times appeared quite separate projects - provided individuals with a means 
of adjusting to the most troubling aspects of their new reality by re-focusing the finality and 
temporality of their predicament, as well as contesting notions of legal and moral guilt. 
Denial of the offence was a defence mechanism that seemed to hold at bay the painful 
realities entailed by a conviction for murder. Much like the terminally ill patient denying the 
reality of their diagnosis (cf. Kübler-Ross, 1969/1997:51), denial of the offence ‘function[ed] 
as a buffer’ between the prisoner and the ‘uncomfortable and painful situation’ of having taken 
a human life. As Mathiassen (2016:3) also identified, the self-recognition of the capability to 
kill caused in some interviewees a deep sense of ‘mourning’ – both for their lives, and the lives 
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they had caused to end - and fractured their self-perceptions. This resulted in the painful quest 
to reconcile their own sense of ‘self’ with that of an individual ‘capable of taking another 
person’s life’ (cf. Mathiassen, 2016:3):   
 
I didn’t wanna have to accept that I took a human life […] I couldn’t believe I could be 
that person? So it took a long time for me to actually fully accept that no matter what 
way I look at it, I did take someone’s life. 
John, late twenties, 15-year tariff, Mid 
 
As such, some described coming to terms with the sentence length as almost immaterial in 
comparison to the task of coming to terms with the implications of committing a murder, as 
one mid-sentence interviewee reflected: 
 
Coming to terms with your sentence, you do that pretty early, innit? It’s something that 
you have to do? […] But coming to terms with what you’ve done is a completely 
different ballgame. And I don’t think it really happens in that first stage. Not for me 
anyway. It took me a long time to realise. 
Asad, early thirties, 18-year tariff, Mid  
 
For some, the implications of this realisation was a deep self-loathing, and a sense of 
not deserving to live while their victim was unable to do the same, and such perceptions could 
result in a bleak existential ‘nothingness’, leaving individuals disinclined to direct themselves 
towards the future (Mathiassen, 2016). 
While it is true that for some coming to terms with the sentence was a comparatively 
easy project when measured against coming to terms with the offence, the length of prison time 
they were facing also represented a cause for defensive denial. Denial of time and the sentence 
helped interviewees to cope with temporal frameworks which lay outside their coping 
capacities by allowing them to dispute the existence of time, rather than seeking to wipe out 
their conscious acknowledgment of it. For those struggling to adjust to the length of their 
sentence in the initial period of confinement, denial of the permanence of their new reality 
offered hope and ‘light’ in the darkness and pain of the early stage: 
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I was in denial for a while […] I was just thinking ... ‘I’ll get out soon possibly’ […] I 
was looking for the light at the end of the tunnel. 
Dean, late teens, 16-year tariff, Early  
 
Cohen and Taylor (1972:92) argue that ‘obsessively thinking’ about the future time to be 
served is ‘a near certain way of doing hard time’. For many interviewees, denying time - either 
by focussing on the immediate present, or refusing to consider the sentence in its temporal 
entirety - made the sentence more manageable: 
 
I just take each day as it comes because if you start thinking too far ahead, then it's a lot 
harder … it is a lot harder if you take it in too big a chunk. 
Carl, early twenties, 25-year tariff, Early  
 
[T]here are days when it consumes you, and there is no way that I could take it more 
than one day at a time. Because, at the moment, I don't see a future and I don't see a life. 
Maria, early twenties, 20+ years’ tariff, Early  
 
Those who did consider the entire span of their sentence devised strategies for segmenting 
time, breaking it down into more manageable and meaningful chunks (see O’Donnell 2014), 
for example, through a timetable of major sporting tournaments, such as a series of World Cups 
(held four years apart), or into the years it would take to progress through various security 
categories: 
 
I’ll have another 3 or 4 years here. Then there will be close to 20 left. Then I’ll be Cat 
B, and before you know it, you’re in D Cat and you can go home. 
Terrance, mid-twenties, 28-year tariff, Early 
 
Even where such methods appeared as a form of guileless optimism, breezily talking away the 
decades ahead, it was clear that they provided feelings of control or mastery over the time. 
 
Yet just as it was impossible to disentangle the key components of entry shock from one 
another, so denial of time, denial of the sentence and denial of the offence were bound up with 
one another, particularly as the latter could offer an element of ‘hope’ for evading the former: 
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The shock of being in prison and knowing that I’m doing 18 years - I couldn’t see that 
far into the future […] I couldn’t picture myself doing 18 years. I thought, ‘Well, I can’t 
escape [from prison]’, and at first I was denying the offence, thinking about ‘Maybe I 
can get out on appeal?’ It’s like you’re grasping for hope. 
Alan, early thirties, 18-year tariff, Mid 
 
However, the pro-active nature of appealing a conviction or sentence demarcates it from pure 
re-active denial and pushes it into the realm of sublimation, as discussed below.  
Taking a life represented not simply an assault on the perceptions that individuals had 
previously held about themselves (cf. Pollock, 2000), but also those held about them by others. 
In this sense, denial of the offence enabled early-stage prisoners to retain support of family and 
friends who may otherwise have abandoned them, as well as sidestepping or diminishing the 
deep personal ‘guilt, remorse [and] shame’ associated with ‘being a murderer’ (Ferrito et al, 
2012:329). Again, this was often recognised as a feature of early-stage behaviour only by those 
interviewees who were reflecting back on this period, after many years of imprisonment:  
 
When I got arrested I come up with a lie, basically - a bullshit story that I wasn’t there? 
And I stuck with that story. I couldn’t change it cos I knew that if I had changed it, it 
would look bad upon me […] I was scared of rejection from my family. 
Curtis, late twenties, 19-year tariff, Mid  
 
My mother put me in a very awkward position […] She said “You know, if I find out 
that you’ve done this, I will disown you”. And so I had to adopt a denial stance on it. 
Ray, early fifties, 15-year tariff, served 35+ years 
 
None of this is to suggest that offence denial was either disingenuous or represented a 
misrepresentation of the truth. There is good reason to believe that some interviewees who 
contested the legitimacy of their conviction did so not because they were ‘in denial’, but 
because they did not personally commit the act of murder for which they were convicted.
10
 
                                                 
10
 Such individuals had often received convictions in accordance with the common law of Joint Enterprise; a form 
of secondary legal liability which Crewe, Liebling, Virgo and Padfield (2015) argue is ‘an unfair and unclear’ 
doctrine, being ambiguous in nature and perceptibly illegitimate in its application. Such feelings of illegitimacy 
were borne out in the current study, where almost three-quarters of the men (74 per cent) and half of the women 
(50 per cent) convicted in accordance with Joint Enterprise felt that they were not guilty of the specific crime of 
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Neither was the denial represented here the sort of ‘deviant’, ‘unhealthy’ or 
‘pathological’/maladaptive denial discussed by Strauss and colleagues (1990). Indeed, the 
psychic need to push away the type of realities facing these young men and women was 
completely understandable. As Crawley and Sparks (2006:72) note, ‘to surrender oneself to the 
meaningless world of the prison as a life project must be truly terrible’.  
‘Sublimation’  
Along with humour and suppression, sublimation has been identified as a mature, or high 
adaptive, behavioural response ‘at times of crisis’ (see e.g. Valliant, 1994:47; Cramer, 2000). 
While the original Freudian definition focused on defending against (intolerable) sexual 
instinct and urges (Baumeister et al, 1998), an expansive definition of sublimation engages 
with the ways in which people cope with and respond more broadly to ‘generally intolerable 
affects’ (moods and emotional states) via ‘self-satisfying and socially acceptable means’ 
(Diehl, Chui, Hay, et al, 2014:34): 
 
[W]ith sublimation, instincts are channelled rather than dammed or diverted. Successful 
artistic expression remains the classic example […] [F]eelings are acknowledged, 
modified, and directed toward a relatively significant […] goal. 
(Valliant, 1971:118) (emphasis added) 
 
It is this goal-centred and self-satisfying nature of sublimation, along with the focus on ‘artistic 
or intellectual endeavors’ (Baumeister et al, 1998:1103), which distinguishes it in the literature 
from the socially unacceptable, oblivion-oriented defence of substance use (suppression), or 
the ‘relatively pathological’ and inactive response of denial (cf. Valliant, 1971:109).  
 
For some interviewees, then, instead of defending against their feelings of sadness, guilt, and 
despair via suppression or denial, their reaction represented a channelling of these emotions 
into positive and intellectual endeavours. Often, this represented a symbolic act of claiming 
back part of the life they had hoped for prior to coming to prison: 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
murder. Many identified themselves as guilty of an offence – for example, manslaughter or perverting the course 
of justice – but (as a ‘secondary offender’) not one that warranted the same punishment as the ‘primary 
offender’/main protagonist (Hulley, Crewe & Wright, 2015). 
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I want to be able to do a degree while I’m in here. Because it would be a shame for me, 
personally, to have come so close to going to uni [prior to conviction] and then deciding 
I’ll never go [...] If I’ve got that potential, then I might as well see fit to put good use to 
it. 
Carl, early twenties, 25-year tariff, Early  
 
Along with such intellectual endeavours, other ‘socially acceptable’ (cf. Diehl et al, 2014) 
sublimations involved pseudo-legal activity, for example sifting through case papers, looking 
for “loopholes” to challenge a conviction, and launching formal appeals. Such pro-active 
behaviour, which actively challenged rather than simply denied the predicament, offered 
‘lifers’ a means of “giving themselves hope” [Asad, early thirties, 18-year tariff, Mid]. Again, 
it is this active element which separates sublimation from denial. 
Reflecting back, interviewees further into their sentence described how channelling 
their energy into an appeal was a crucial “coping mechanism” in the early years: 
 
At what point did you appeal? 
Straightaway […] Like you do. Every lifer up and down the country does the same 
thing. For the first 10 years […] [appealing] is another coping mechanism to get you 
through. 
Roger, early forties, 20-year tariff, served 20+ years 
 
I appealed both [sentence and conviction] […] I think it's just a bid for freedom. You 
know, like, in the olden days people used to escape. And nowadays there's none of that, 
[appealing is] just a natural thing to do. 
Willis, late thirties, 19-year tariff, Mid 
 
It is this channelling of the ‘intolerable’ pains of long-term imprisonment into direct and 
positive action, and ‘socially acceptable’ forms, which distinguishes sublimation from 
suppression (the means of which are not necessarily ‘socially acceptable’) and denial (the 
character of which is seldom concerned with ‘action’, ‘goal-orientated’ or otherwise).   
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Concluding thoughts  
The frameworks used for making sense of the processes by which prisoners react and adapt to 
the experience of confinement have tended to be sociological or psychological, neglecting the 
possibility that psychoanalytic concepts might be of value in understanding how prisoners 
make sense of and manage what they are forced to undergo. Given that Sykes, in his classic 
(1958/2007) account of the pains of imprisonment, makes frequent reference to psychoanalytic 
concepts - ‘latent’ sexual tendencies (p.71), ‘feelings at [both] the conscious and unconscious 
level’ (p.71); ‘ego image’ (p.72); ‘Super-Ego’ (p.73) – the absence of such concepts from 
mainstream penological analysis is all the more notable. The prisoner, Sykes notes, must 
defend against threats to his [sic] self-conception: ‘Rejection or degradation by the free 
community must be warded off, turned aside, rendered harmless’ (p.67). While we make no 
claims to have employed Freudian terminology in an orthodox sense, our argument in this 
paper is that they are of particular relevance to a population which is forced to confront an 
especially extreme set of circumstances: both the commission of murder, and the prospect of an 
exceptionally long period of custody, starting at a point in life when adulthood has barely 
begun. While we did not set out to explore the psychic implications of either part of this 
Offence-Time Nexus, their relevance to the early stage of the sentence was especially apparent.  
It is for further articles (Crewe, Hulley & Wright, under review) to explore how our 
population progressed through the sentence, and for other scholars to see whether the kind of 
framework that we have adopted here might be pertinent to other kinds of prisoners serving 
other kinds of sentences. 
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Table 1: Basic demographic data of the male and female interviewees in the current study 
 Interviewees – Male  Interviewees - Female 
28 
 
 No. of prisons 15 9 
No. of participants 126 21 
Ethnicity 53.2% - White 
30.2% - Black 
8.8% - Asian 
7.9% - ‘mixed race’ 
0% - ‘other’ 
85.7% - White 
4.8% - Black 
0% - Asian 
9.5% - ‘mixed race’ 
0% - ‘other’ 
Age range (in years) 18-67 20-45 
Mean age (in years) 30 28 
Mean age (at time of 
research) by sentence stage 
(in years) 
Early – 22.3 
Mid – 30.2 
Late – 40.7 
Late (over-tariff) – 49.3 
- 
Early – 23.4 
Mid – 20.0 
Late – 33.0 
Late (over-tariff) – 42.0 
Other – 35.5 
Age sentenced (in years) 13-25 16-25 
Mean age sentenced (in 
years) 
20 20 
Mean age (at sentence) by 
sentence stage (in years) 
Early – 19.5 
Mid – 21.0 
Late – 21.7 
Late (over- tariff) – 20.9 
- 
Early – 21.0 
Mid – 19.8 
Late – 18.5 
Late (over- tariff) – 22.0 
Other: 21.5 
Tariff range (in years) 15-35 15-25 
Mean tariff (in years) 20 18.7 
Time served  10 months - 42 years 10 months - 22 years 
Mean time served (in years) 10 8 
